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ISSUES IN THE REAUTHORIZATION OF THE
MAGNUSON FISHERY CONSERVATION AND
MANAGEMENT ACT
Almost 20 years have passed since the Fishery Conservation and
Management Act (later renamed the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and
Management Act) became law in 1976.1 In many areas the Act has been
highly successful. It succeeded in extending United States fishery'
management jurisdiction out to 200 nautical miles off the U.S. coastline,
it 'Americanized' a valuable economic resource, and it created a new
level of the federal government called the regional council system to
oversee that resource. Perhaps its greatest success, the Act effectively
eliminated foreign fishing within the 200-mile band now known as the
exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The foreign vessels that used to fish off
the U.S. coasts have been replaced by a fleet of U.S.-owned vessels.
These vessels have dramatically increased their catches from about 1.56
billion pounds in 1977 to more than 6.32 billion pounds in 1993.3 This
has not only created billions of dollars in annual revenues for U.S.
fishing companies, but has also created thousands of jobs for U.S.
citizens. 4
1. 16 U.S.C. § 1801-1882 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). In 1980, the Act was renamed
the "Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act" after the late Senator
Warren G. Magnuson of Washington who was the Senate sponsor of the original law.
See Pub. L. No. 96-561, § 238, 94 Stat. 3300 (amending 16 U.S.C. § 1801).
2. "Fishery" is defined by the Act as: "(A) one or more stocks of fish which can
be treated as a unit for purposes of conservation and management and which are
identified on the basis of geographical, scientific, technical, recreational, and economic
characteristics; and (B) any fishing for such stocks." 16 U.S.C. § 1802(8) (1988).
3. EUGENE H. BucK, MAGNUSONFISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT
REAUTHORIZATION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE ISSUE BRIEF, ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES POLICY DIVISION 4 (1995).
4. In 1992, U.S. commercial fishermen earned $3.7 billion in ex-vessel revenue on
4.8 million metric tons of fish and shellfish. About 80% of these landings were used
directly for human food. The commercial harvesting and seafood processing sectors
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Despite these successes, the Magnuson Act has also had some
failures. Many of the fisheries managed under the Act have been
severely overfished. The New England groundfish resource is a good
example. Other fisheries are heavily overcapitalized. Simply put, too
many vessels compete for too few fish, causing economic inefficiency
and overfishing. Inefficiency is also apparent in modem fishing
techniques which involve the discard of large numbers of fish and which
result in the bycatch of non-target marine species.' Furthermore, there
are significant resource allocation struggles between competing groups
of fishermen which hamper the implementation of the Act. These
struggles are being resolved by regional councils whose members often
have direct financial interests in the outcome of their decisions.
The current authorization for appropriations for the Magnuson Act
expired at the end of fiscal year 1993. The issue for the 104th Congress
will be how to improve the existing regime for fisheries conservation and
management in offshore federal waters given the Act's successes and
failures.' This research note begins with a discussion of the history of
the Magnuson Act in Part I. Part II evaluates the Act and discusses three
significant problems associated with the Act: overfishing, inefficiency,
and conflicts of interest in the regional councils. Part I analyzes
pending bills in the House of Representatives (H.R. 39) and the Senate
(S. 39). The note concludes that although the Magnuson Act has failed
in preventing overfishing, it contains the tools for effective management
and conservation of the U.S. fisheries resource. The proposed
modifications will strengthen the Act and enable the U.S. to achieve the
long term goal of managing each fishery for a harvest level equivalent
to the "optimum yield."
support over 300,000 full time jobs. NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, UNITED
STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, OUR LIVING OCEANS: REPORT ON THE STATUS OF U.S.
LIVING MARINE RESOURCES, NOAA TECH. MEM. 3 (NMFS-F/SPO-15, Dec. 1993)
[hereinafter OUR LIVING OCEANS].
5. "Bycatch" refers to the incidental capture of nontargeted species. Usually
bycatch is returned to the sea or discarded. Id. at 19.
6. BUCK, supra note 3, at 7.
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I. HISMRY
A. Pre-Magnuson Act Background
To fully appreciate the successes and failures of the Magnuson Act
it is necessary to have some understanding of the law of fisheries
management before 1976. Prior to the enactment of the Magnuson Act,
all vessels were free to fish beyond the three-mile territorial sea7 and the
adjacent nine-mile contiguous zone.' Fisheries regulation in the world's
oceans beyond this twelve-mile area was governed by sparse international
law. Inside the U.S. coastal waters, management of the fisheries fell
within the jurisdiction of each individual coastal state.9
Prior to the early part of the twentieth century, exploitation of high
seas fishery resources proceeded under a regime of unregulated
competition among nations."0 This scheme worked as long as existing
fishing effort remained at a level below maximum sustainable yield
(MSY)." After World War II, fishing effort dramatically increased with
the advent of new fishing technologies and the increase in fishermen.
U.S. fishermen interested in restricting foreign access to the rich
resources off the U.S. coasts joined forces with oil interests and lobbied
the government to extend the United States exclusive jurisdiction. In
7. A territorial sea of three nautical miles from the shore was widely acknowledged
by the world community as exclusively within the sovereignty of each coastal nation.
The rule of freedom of fishing was based on the idea that fish were a common property
resource, not "owned" until captured. See FEDERAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT, A
GUIDEBOOK TO THE MAGNUSON FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT 2 (1.
Jacobson et al. eds., 1985 & Supp. 1991) [hereinafter GUIDEBOOK].
8. In 1966 the United States established a fisheries zone of nine miles contiguous
to the territorial sea. Within this zone the U.S. retained the same exclusive jurisdiction
over fisheries as it had in the territorial sea. Bartlett Act, Pub. L. No. 89-658, 80 Stat.
908 (1966). The Bartlett Act was later superseded by the Magnuson Act.
9. See generally Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1891) (affirming
State's rights to manage menhaden fisheries); Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission,
334 U.S. 410 (1948) (the individual states, in the absence of federal action, have the
right to control fishing); Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 U.S. 422 (1936)
(California landing law affecting fishing outside State's waters was valid); Skiriotes v.
Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941) (Florida could validly regulate conduct of resident fishermen
even in fisheries located outside of State waters).
10. GUIDEBOOK, supra note 7, at 2.
11. "Maximum sustainable yield" is defined as "the largest average annual catch
or yield that can be taken over a significant period of time from each stock under
prevailing ecological and environmental conditions." 50 C.F.R. § 602-11(d)(1) (1994).
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1945, President Truman reacted to U.S. interests by issuing two
proclamations: The Policy of the United States with Respect to Coastal
Fisheries in Certain Areas of the High Seas and The Policy of the United
States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Seabed
of the Continental Shelf.2 The proclamation concerning coastal fisheries
created the first fisheries conservation zone, a zone without defined
boundaries. 3
The proclamation contained two significant principles. First, the
United States could establish conservation zones on the high seas for the
purpose of protecting its coastal fisheries from overfishing. Second, the
United States recognized the right of other nations to take similar steps
to protect their coastal fisheries. 4 While the coastal fisheries proclama-
tion was never implemented in the United States, 5 it triggered reactions
from other fishing nations. Countries like Peru, Ecuador and Chile
unilaterally extended their sovereign jurisdiction out to 200 nautical
miles.' 6
The Truman Proclamations provided a basis in customary interna-
tional law for coastal states to extend their jurisdictions seaward for the
conservation of fisheries and the preservation of exclusive fishing rights
for the coastal states.' 7 This movement affected the United States in two
ways due to the peculiar nature of its fishing industry. Fishermen who
worked primarily off the coasts of the United States favored the
unilateral extension of fisheries jurisdiction as a means of getting rid of
their foreign competitors. Alternatively, U.S. distant-water fishermen,
who primarily fished off Latin America and in the central Pacific Ocean,
12. Proclamation No. 2668, 3 C.F.R. 68 (1943-1948 Compilation); Proclamation
No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1943-1948 Compilation).
13. Warren G. Magnuson, The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976:
First Step Toward Improved Management of Marine Fisheries, 52 WASH. L. REv. 427,
430 (1977).
14. Id. at 429.
15. The text of the proclamation stated that the United States regarded it as proper
to establish conservation zones in areas contiguous to the coasts. Instead of actually
establishing conservation zones, the proclamation resulted in encouraging nations fishing
off the United States to participate in treaty negotiations. These treaties ultimately were
unsuccessful at reducing foreign fishing effort off the U.S. coasts. See generally Eldon
V. Greenberg and Michael E. Shapiro, Federalism in the Fishery Conservation Zone: A
New Role for the States in an Era of Federal Regulatory Reform, 55 So. CAL. L. REV.
641 (1982).
16. GUIDEBOOK, supra note 7, at 4.
17. Magnuson, supra note 13, at 430.
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opposed extension of fisheries jurisdiction because it severely restricted
their fishing range.' 8 The loss of fishing access for U.S. distant water
fishermen and the increased fishing effort applied by foreign vessels off
the U.S. coasts created the impetus for the passage of the Magnuson Act.
B. Structure and Scope of the Magnuson Act
There were two broad purposes of the Magnuson Act:' 9 (1) to
extend the jurisdiction of the United States for the purpose of regulating
marine fisheries out to 200 nautical miles from the coast and (2) to
control foreign access to the resources in this zone. The Act was, and
still remains, organized in four titles. Title I states the authority of the
United States regarding fishery management. In simple terms, it is the
basic jurisdiction provision. Title II governs foreign fishing access to
fisheries located within the U.S. EEZ. Title III specifies the national
fishery management program, and Title IV contains miscellaneous
provisions. The Act has been significantly amended since 1976 but the
following sets out the original scheme.
Title I establishes the fishery conservation zone, now known as the
exclusive economic zone (EEZ), ° which extends seaward from the
coastal baseline out to 200 nautical miles.2' Within the EEZ the United
States proclaimed exclusive fishery management authority over all fish'I
except highly migratory species,' defined in the Act as tuna.'
18. The most important distant water fishing was the Pacific distant water tuna
fishery. Tuna, a highly popular and valuable fish, are primarily located outside of the
200 nautical mile band on the Pacific coast.
19. A comprehensive legislative history of the original Magnuson Act is beyond the
scope of this research note. If interested, the reader should consult LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, OCEAN AND COASTAL RESOURCES
PRoJECT, 94TH CONG., 2D SEss., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FISHERY
CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
20. In 1986 the Magnuson Act was amended and the fishery conservation zone was
redesignated the exclusive economic zone. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1807(6), 1811(1988). This
amendment partially implemented President Reagan's 1983 Exclusive Economic Zone
Proclamation. Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (1983).
21. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1453, 1802(6), 1811 (1988).
22. 16 U.S.C. § 1811(a) (1988).
23. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1811(a), 1812 (1988).
24. 16 U.S.C. § 1802(14) (1988). The Act also authorizes the management of
anadromous species that spawn in U.S. waters throughout their range. This means that
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Title II set up a scheme authorizing foreign fishing within the EEZ
if (1) a treaty or international fishery agreement is in force and (2) the
country wishing to fish enters into a governing international fishery
agreement with the United States.' Foreign fishermen were given the
right to fish for only that portion of the "optimum yield" (OY) 6 that was
not harvested by U.S. fishermen. This portion was termed the total
allowable level of foreign fishing (TALFF).
Title III establishes eight Regional Fishery Management Councils to
implement the management and conservation goals of the Act. The
Councils are a new level of government. They are neither state nor
federal in character. Their duties are: "(1) to develop and amend
fishery management plans (FMPs); (2) to submit periodic reports to the
Secretary of Commerce; (3) to review and revise assessments of
optimum yield and fishing allowances to foreign vessels; (4) to encourage
public participation, through hearings, in the development of fishery
management plans and the administration of the Act; (5) to establish
scientific and statistical committees and advisory panels; and (6) to
undertake other activities necessary for carrying out the Act. "'
The voting members of the Councils are made up of state fishery
management officials, the regional directors of the National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS), and other individuals who are both knowl-
edgeable and experienced with regard to the management and conserva-
tion, or the recreational or commercial harvest of the fishery resources
of the geographical area concerned.29 These individuals are chosen by
the United States claimed jurisdiction even when the fish were outside the U.S. EEZ.
16 U.S.C. § 1821 (1988).
25. 16 U.S.C. § 1821 (1988). This was later amended as will be discussed within
Subpart B.
26. "Optimum yield" is defined as the amount of fish-
(A) which will provide the greatest overall benefit to the Nation, with particular
reference to food production and recreational opportunities; and
(B) which is prescribed as such on the basis of the maximum sustainable yield
from such fishery, as modified by any relevant economic, social, or ecological
factor.
16 U.S.C. § 1802(18) (1988).
27. 16 U.S.C. § 1852 (1988). The Councils have jurisdiction of specific
geographic regions and are broken down into the: New England Council, Mid-Atlantic
Council, South Atlantic Council, Caribbean Council, Gulf Council, Pacific Council,
North Pacific Council and Western Pacific Council.
28. Magnuson, supra note 13, at 436.
29. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(b)(2)(A) (1988).
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the Secretary of Commerce from lists submitted by the governors of the
states represented on the Councils.3"
The Council's main task is to establish FMPs. All FMPs and their
implementing regulations must be consistent with seven substantive
policies, or, "national standards" for fishery conservation and manage-
ment.3" The Secretary of Commerce has established guidelines based on
these national standards to assist the Councils in their task 2.3  The plans
are to be submitted to the United States Department of Commerce for
approval and implementation by federal agency rulemaking.)
II. EVALUATION OF THE MAGNUSON ACT
A. Operation of the Act
The Magnuson Act made five significant changes in the management
system of U.S. fisheries. These are: the abandonment of state control of
coastal fisheries, the imposition of control over foreign fishing, the use
30. Id.
31. The seven national standards are:
(1) Conservation and management measures shall prevent overfishing while
achieving ... the optimum yield from each fishery ....
(2) Conservation and management measures shall be based upon the best
scientific information available.
(3) To the extent practicable, an individual stock of fish shall be managed as
a unit throughout its range ....
(4) Conservation and management measures shall not discriminate between
residents of different States.
(5) Conservation and management measures shall, where practicable, promote
efficiency in the utilization of fishery resources; except that no such measure
shall have economic allocation as its sole purpose.
(6) Conservation and management measures shall take into account and allow
for variations among, and contingencies in, fisheries, fishery resources and
catches.
(7) Conservation and management measures shall, where practicable, minimize
costs and avoid unnecessary duplication.
16 U.S.C. § 1851(a) (1988).
32. Guidelines for Development of Fishery Management Plans, 50 C.F.R. pt. 602
(1994).
33. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1852-1855 (1988).
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of optimum yield as a management concept, the exclusion of tuna from
fisheries jurisdiction, and the adoption of the council system.'
1. The Role of the States
The Magnuson Act addresses fishery management so comprehen-
sively that, under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution," it preempts
any state authority that is not preserved. Only a limited role has been
left to the states. Within each state's three-mile territorial sea, the state
retains management authority." Outside of state waters a state may not
directly or indirectly regulate any fishing unless a vessel is registered
under the laws of that state and such regulation may not conflict with any
FMP regulations.37
2. Foreign Fishing
Under the Magnuson Act, Congress put as many controls on foreign
fishing as possible to deal with the expansion of foreign fleets fishing off
U.S. coasts in the years prior to 1976. Between 1938 and 1973, the
quantity of fish harvested off the United States tripled, increasing from
around 4.4 billion pounds to 11.8 billion pounds while the landing of
American vessels increased only minimally during this period, from 4.3
to 4.7 billion pounds.38 Notwithstanding this large foreign take, the Act,
at its inception, was aimed at merely controlling foreign fishing, not
excluding it entirely.
34. Robert G. Hayes, Original Intent of the Magnuson Act Framers, in
CONSERVING AMERICA'S FISHERIES: A NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON THE MAGNUSON ACT
39, 41-44 (Richard H. Stroud, ed., 1994).
35. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
36. 16 U.S.C. § 1856(a) (1988). A state's ability to regulate fishermen directly and
indirectly has been the subject of at least ten suits since the inception of the Act. See
generally, State of Alaska v. F/V Baranof, 677 P.2d 1245 (Alaska 1984), Southeastern
Fisheries Assoc. v. Chiles, 979 F.2d 1504 (1 1th Cir. 1992).
37. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1856(a)-(b). See generally, Jill Bubier & Alison Rieser,
Preemption or Supersession of State Regulation in the Territorial Sea, 4 TER. SEA 1
(1984); Martha Grant, Overlapping State and Federal Jurisdiction Under the FCMA:
Judicial Interpretation of Section 306(a) in California v. Weeren, 1 TERR. SEA 1 (1981).
38. GUIDEBOOK, supra note 7, at 11-12.
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3. Optimum Yield
A new tool to achieve control of both foreign and U.S. fishermen
was embodied in the concept of optimum yield. 39 The optimum yield
goal allowed the Regional Councils significant flexibility in determining
the total allowable catch of fish. By allowing the Councils to set the
optimum yield at levels above the maximum sustainable yield, Congress,
in effect, allowed the Councils complete discretion in developing FMPs.
4. Highly Migratory Species
In order to reconcile the disparate interests of U.S. coastal fishermen
and U.S. distant water fishermen, the Magnuson Act excepted from its
application highly migratory species of tuna, defined as those "species
which in the course of their life cycle, spawn and migrate over great
distances in waters of the ocean."I° The tuna were the only species
exempted from the Magnuson Act's establishment of U.S. fishery
management authority within the EEZ. The exemption was officially
justified by claiming that the highly migratory nature of the fish
precluded individual states from subjecting the fish to national controls.4
Yet many other nations did not exclude tuna from their claims of
exclusive fishery jurisdiction within their EEZs. The real rationale for
the U.S. exclusion was to appease the needs of the Pacific distant water
fishing fleets. This rationale was stated by Senator Weicker while
chairing a hearing before the National Ocean Policy Study in 1981:
This exclusion allows our distant water tuna fleet to disregard
judicial claims by other nations on tuna within their own waters.
Present U.S. policy therefore allows our tuna boats to enter
foreign waters against the will of the claimant nation. A Federal
fund, jointly shared with industry is then used to pay the fines
of the vessels if seized by a foreign government.42
39. See supra note 26.
40. 16 U.S.C. § 1802 (14) (1988).
41. LEGWsLATrvE HISTORY, supra note 19, at 679.
42. Hearings on S. 1564, Before the Nat'l Ocean Policy Study of the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 97th Cong., lstSess. 1 (1981) (statement of
Sen. Weicker) reprinted in David C. Hoover, A Case Against International Management
of Highly Migratory Marine Fishery Resources: The Atlantic Bluefin Tuna, 11 B.C.
ENVTL. AFFL. REv. 11, 22 (1983).
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The Magnuson Act policy allowed the United States to have the best
of both worlds. U.S. fishermen were authorized to exploit other nation's
EEZs for valuable fish while at the same time the United States could
exclude foreigners from taking valuable resources from the U.S. EEZ.
The "fund" noted by Senator Weicker referred to a policy enacted in the
United States in 1978 through an amendment of the Fishermen's
Protective Act of 1954.43
The Fishermen's Protective Act protected U.S. fishermen by
providing that, if a vessel was seized by a foreign government for fishing
within the government's EEZ, the U.S. would pay any foreign fine or
penalty levied and would reimburse the owner of the vessel the amount
of the fine. This overall policy of excluding tuna from the Magnuson
Act's authority was reversed through a significant amendment to the Act
in 1990 and will be discussed below.
5. The Regional Councils
The theory behind the regional council system was to allow
interested individuals to participate in fishery management decisions and
to recognize regional differences in fisheries and fishing opportunities.
Hence, recreational and commercial fishermen were given a prominent
role on the Councils. The Act divides the United States into eight
regions to allow the people with knowledge of particular local and
regional needs to have council representation.' Further, the Act requires
that council members be knowledgeable or experienced with regard to
the conservation and management, or the recreational or commercial
harvest, of the fishery resources within their geographic area of
responsibility. Congress specifically allowed fishing interests to
participate in management decisions because Congress believed, in the
words of Senator Magnuson, "that this institutional arrangement [was]
the best hope [the United States could] have of obtaining fishery
43. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1980 (1988).
44. The Councils' titles and geographic areas are: (1) New England-Maine, New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut; (2) Mid-Atlantic-New York,
New Jersey, Delaware, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia; (3) South Atlantic-North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida (4) Caribbean-Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico;
(5) Gulf-Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida (6) Pacific-California,
Oregon, Idaho, Washington; (7) North Pacific-Oregon, Washington, Alaska; (8)
Western Pacific-Hawaii, American Samoa, Guam, and the North Mariana Islands. 16
U.S.C. § 1852 (1988).
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management decisions which in fact protect the fish and which, at the
same time, have the support of the fishermen who are regulated. "45 This
requirement has created situations in which council members may have
personal or financial interests in a fishery they are responsible for
managing.
In fashioning a system where knowledgeable and experienced
private citizens are placed on the councils and put in charge of making
management decisions Congress was aware of the potential conflicts of
interest that could arise.' The authors of the Magnuson Act therefore
created several safeguards to mitigate conflicts.
First, they created the national standards upon which fishery
management plans were to be based. Second, they imposed a review
process on council FMPs. While the regional council may prepare and
submit to the Secretary of Commerce proposed regulations that would
implement the FMP, it is the Secretary who must promulgate and
implement the regulations.4 7 The FMP regulations are then published in
the Federal Register for public comment. Only after the Secretary
approves the FMP does the plan go into effect. Congress recognized that
a further check on this system would be afforded through judicial review.
In addition, two further important checks were placed on council
decisionmaking.' s First, the councils were made subject to the Federal
Advisory Committee Act (FACA).49 FACA ensures that the operation
of advisory committees within the executive branch of government is
controlled so that private interests cannot exercise undue influence upon
government.' Second, the conflict of interest provisions of the United
States Code were imposed on the councils.51 This Code prohibits federal
45. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY supra note 19, at 455.
46. William N. Myhre, The Law of Unintended Consequences: Putting Theory into
Practice, in CONSERVING AMERIcA'S FISHERIES: A NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON THE
MAGNUSON ACT 47, 49 (Richard H. Stroud, ed., 1994).
47. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(c) (1988). The Secretary of Commerce, through the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) National Marine Fisheries
Service adopts and implements the FMPs through administrative rules and yearly fishing
quotas. See 16 U.S.C. § 1854(b) (1988) (implementation of plans). The approved plans
appear at 50 C.F.R. §§ 630-699 (1994).
48. Myhre, supra note 46, at 49-50.
49. 5 U.S.C. app. § 1 (1988).
50. See H.R. RFP. No. 1017, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1972), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3491, 3496.
51. 18 U.S.C. § 208 (1988).
333
334 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1:323
employees from participating in matters in which they have a financial
interest.
Unfortunately, these safeguards have not endured over time to keep
the councils free from conflicts of interest. This will be discussed
below.
B. Significant Amendments to the Magnuson Act
The Magnuson Act has been significantly modified since it became
law in 1976. Understanding the changes that have come before will
enable members of the 104th Congress to make wise policy changes
during the current reauthorization.
While there have been several amendments to the Act, the most
significant changes have been made with respect to foreign fishing by
amending Title I and, with respect to the U.S. tuna policy, by amending
Title .152 Title II was amended in 1980 with the passage of the
American Fisheries Protection Act. 3 As previously noted, the Magnuson
Act provides that the TALFF for a fishery within the EEZ is limited to
that portion of the optimum yield not harvested by U.S. fishing vessels.
Many legislators had hoped that, given priority under the Act, the U.S.
fishing industry would grow and develop.' An expansion of the
domestic fishing industry was desirable because it meant more U.S. jobs,
increases to the gross national product and increases in exports. But this
expansion did not occur immediately. Congress assessed the U.S.
fishing industry in 1980 and found that U.S. fishermen were harvesting
only 33 percent of the total volume of fish caught in the U.S. EEZ.55
The anticipated domestic displacement of foreign vessels was not
occurring.
The 1980 Act was designed to remedy this. It provided for a phased
reduction of foreign fishing by giving the regional councils new formulas
for deriving the TALF s6  The new reduction formulas allowed
52. The Magnuson Act has been modified with respect to fishery habitat provisions.
In 1986, Congress included two habitat provisions as a response to the Councils'
concerns regarding adverse effects of habitat changes on fisheries. See 1986
Amendments, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1852(i), 1853(a)(7) (1988).
53. Act of Dec. 22, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-561, §§ 230-238, 94 Stat. 3275, 3296-
3300 (1980).
54. GUIDEBOOK, supra note 7, at 24.
55. Id. at 25.
56. 16 U.S.C. § 1821 (1988).
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increases in U.S. fishing to trigger even greater reductions in foreign
fishing. The new formulas, combined with a council's ability to
manipulate the optimum yield in a fishery, allowed for the near complete
expulsion of foreign fishing in the U.S. EEZ. Foreign harvests declined
from about 3.8 billion pounds in 1977, to only about 12 million pounds
in 1991. Commensurate with the decline of foreign harvest, domestic
harvest increased from about 1.56 billion pounds in 1977 to more than
6.32 billion pounds in 1993.1 Thus, the percent of fish harvested by
foreign nations from the U.S. EEZ declined from 71 percent in 1977 to
about 0.0 percent in 1992.58 A milestone was reached in 1992 as it was
the first year since the Act was implemented when there were no foreign
fishing operations in the U.S. EEZ.59 Thus, the Magnuson Act has
successfully accomplished its initial goal of Americanizing the fisheries
off U.S. coasts.
The second significant amendment to the Magnuson Act concerned
Title I, national jurisdiction. The original Act had excluded highly
migratory species. The reason articulated for this exclusion was that,
because of their transitory nature, efforts to conserve and manage these
fish required a high degree of international cooperation and coordination
to be effective. The United States had relied on international agreements
for managing these highly migratory species. This position had been a
source of continued debate since the Act's enactment in 1976. In
contrast to the United States, almost all other nations claimed jurisdiction
over all fishery resources, including tuna, within their EEZs. Opponents
of the U.S. position persuasively argued that recognition of coastal nation
authority over tuna was not necessarily incompatible with international
management schemes.' The opponents suggested that changing the U.S.
tuna policy would improve international relations and allow more
effective fishery management within the U.S. EEZ.
Congress bowed to the international and domestic pressure to change
the tuna policy by enacting the Fishery Conservation Amendments of
57. BUCK supra note 3, at 4.
58. Id.
59. William W. Fox, Jr., The National Interest in Fish Conservation, in CON-
SERVING AMERICA'S FISHERIES: A NATIONAL SYMPOsIUM ON THE MAGNUSON ACT 7
(Richard H. Stroud, ed. 1994).
60. FISHERY CONSERVATION AMENDMENTS OF 1990, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, S. Rep. No. 414, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 4 (1990) [hereinafter COMMITTEE REPORT].
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1990.61 Effective January 1, 1992, the exception of highly migratory
species was struck from the U.S. declaration of sovereign rights and
exclusive management authority within the U.S. EEZ. Congress
explicitly recognized other nations' sovereign rights to regulate tuna
within their own EEZs. 62
Giving up lucrative fishing grounds used by the U.S. distant water
tuna fleet was a significant move for the United States. At the time, the
distant water tuna fleet had supported one of the largest and most
valuable fishery-based industries in the United States. For example, in
1990, 20,000 people were employed in the tuna industry in the United
States.63 In 1989, 700,000,000 pounds of canned tuna worth over
$1,000,000,000 were consumed by Americans. During the same period,
the United States caught 41,000,000 pounds of tuna, of which 90 percent
by weight came from foreign or international waters. 6
C. Current Problems Under the Existing Magnuson Act
Current problems with the Magnuson Act can be categorized as
follows: (1) overfishing; (2) inefficiency; and (3) lack of public
confidence in decisions of the Regional Councils due to conflict of
interest among voting members.
1. Overfishing
Overall, fisheries management in the United States has not achieved
the conservation of fish stocks that was anticipated when the Act was
originally passed. U.S. fishermen face strong economic incentives to
"race for fish" because most U.S. fisheries are open access. Because the
fisheries are open to all, fishermen rationally try to catch as many fish
as possible as fast as possible. They know that any fish left in the sea
are potential profit for their competitors. They also know that the fishing
season may close abruptly when the total allowable catch has been
reached. The race for fish often compels fishermen to exceed the total
61. Fishery Conservation Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-627, 104 Stat.
4436 (1990).
62. See Statement by President George Bush Upon Signing H.R. 2061, reprinted
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (101 Stat.) 4436.
63. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 60, at 3.
64. Id.
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allowable catch. Understanding the dimensions of this problem is the
first step toward finding a proper solution.
A comprehensive assessment of the status and potential of U.S.
living marine resources is difficult because the type, quality, and source
of relevant data are highly variable. 5 Yet, based on the best science
available, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) of the United
States Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) recently published its assessment of the United
States fish stocks.' The report concludes that some of the nation's most
valuable fisheries are in serious decline.67 The NMFS considered 231
stocks of fish including about 450 different species and estimated the
long-term potential yield (LTPY) of each stock. LTPY is the maximum
average yield that could be taken in the long term if an appropriate
balance were struck between the level of fishing and the productivity of
the resource. When the number of fish caught equals the number of fish
produced, the stock is considered "fully utilized."' If more fishing
effort is needed to achieve this balance, the stock is deemed "under-
utilized," and if fishing effort exceeds fish, production, the stock is
deemed "overutilized." As of the 1993 report, 29% of the stocks
assessed could not be classified due to insufficient data. Of the stocks
with sufficient data, 40% were overutilized, 43 % were at full utilization
and 17% were underutilized. 69
By region, the northeast and southeast had the largest percentages of
overutilized stocks (45% and 33% respectively). The New England
groundfish fishery demonstrates the problem of overutilization. Stocks
of cod, haddock and yellowtail flounder have literally collapsed causing
disastrous economic and social impacts on the historic fishing communi-
ties of New England. Groundfish landings off the coast of New England
declined from more than 1.6 billion pounds in 1965 to less than 220
million pounds in 1991.70 The commercial fishing industry in
Massachusetts alone was a $300 million industry in 1990; yet, by 1993,
65. Michael P. Sissenwine & Andrew A. Rosenberg, U.S. Living Marine
Resources: Current Status and Long-Term Potential, in CONSERVING AMERICA'S
FISHERIES: A NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON THE MAGNUSON ACT 29, 30 (Richard H. Stroud,
ed., 1994).
66. OuR LIVING OCEANS, supra note 4.
67. Id. at 18.
68. Sissenwine & Rosenberg, supra note 65, at 31.
69. OuR LIVING OCEANS supra note 4, at 19.
70. BUCK supra note 3, at 4.
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revenues from fishing dropped to almost $232 million.7' By one
arnalysis, the cost to New England of depleted groundfish resources in
1993 ran as high as 14,000 lost jobs and $350 million in annual
earnings. 72
The cause of the depleted groundfish fishery has been the New
England Regional Fishery Management Council's failure to prevent
overfishing. 73 An analysis of the New England Council's attempts to halt
the overfishing will show the weaknesses of the Magnuson Act's
management scheme.
The New England Council's first FMP was the Fishery Management
Plan for Atlantic Groundfish. It was implemented in March of 1977 and
established quotas for cod, haddock, and yellowtail, a minimum size for
cod and haddock, a minimum mesh size for fishing nets, and two area
closures.74 The inherent weakness of the plan was its failure to control
entry of new fishing vessels into the fishery. The inevitable consequence
was that the domestic fleet rapidly expanded.75 The domestic expansion
overwhelmed the National Marine Fisheries Service's ability to
effectively administer the quotas.76  Because quotas were being
overfished and because of the economic disaster that would occur if the
71. Hearings on S. 2538, Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (statement of Sen. Kerry).
72. Paul Schneider, Breaking Georges Bank: Controversy Over Fishing Problems
in the Atlantic Ocean off the New England Coast, AUDUBON 85 (1993), available in
LEXIS, ENVIRN Library, CURNWS file.
73. Overfishing is loosely defined as the taking of more fish than a fish population
can naturally replace. Cf. infra note 105.
74. Richard B. Roe, The New England Multispecies Groundfishery, in CONSERVING
AMERICA'S FISHERIES: A NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON THE MAGNUSON ACT 83, 86
(Richard H. Stroud, ed., 1994). Established quotas were 37,000 metric ton (mt) for cod,
14,000 mt for yellowtail and 6,200 mt for haddock. 42 Fed. Reg. 13,998 (1977).
75. The United States contributed to the rapid increase in the domestic fleet through
incentive programs geared at developing the U.S. fishing industry. See Hearings on the
Reauthorization of the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act Before the
Subcomm. on Fisheries, Wildlife and Oceans of the House Comm. on Resources, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statement of John J. Magnuson, Chairman, Committee on
Fisheries, Ocean Studies Board of the National Research Council) available in LEXIS,
LEGIS Library, CNGTST File.
76. Roe, supra note 74, at 86. The Magnuson Act places general enforcement
responsibility on the United States Coast Guard and the Secretary of Commerce. 16
U.S.C. § 1860 (1988). The Secretary has delegated this authority to the National Marine
Fisheries Service. Because of the size of the U.S. EEZ, enforcement has been a major
fishery management problem.
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fishery were simply closed, the Council abandoned the quotas and in
1980 created an "Interim Plan" with less restrictive measures. 77 These
less restrictive measures were large net mesh sizes, area closures and
voluntary data reporting.7' The Interim Plan was replaced in 1987 with
a more long term comprehensive management program. This plan
increased the minimum sizes of cod, haddock and yellowtail flounder, set
minimum sizes for pollock, increased the number of species regulated
and increased minimum net mesh sizes.79
These measures proved ineffective in halting the decline of
groundfish stocks." In 1993 the Council created a plan to reduce
groundfish landings by 50% over a five to seven year period.8 ' The plan
consisted of a moratorium on new entrants, successive annual reduction
in at-sea days for vessels, increases in minimum mesh size for nets and
greater area closures." The Secretary of Commerce considered the plan
inadequate to halt the collapse of groundfish stocks, and beginning on
January 3, 1994, the National Marine Fisheries Service imposed strict
emergency catch limits and tripled the size of the no-fishing areas (from
roughly 620 square miles to around 2,000 square miles).' The
emergency closure was to be effective through June 12, 1995,1 and has
now been continued indefinitely, pending new restrictions on fishing
efforts under consideration by the New England Fishery Management
Council. 8s
What makes the New England situation particularly tragic is that the
overfishing has occurred in an area that formerly was one of the world's
most productive marine regions, Georges Bank.8 For centuries, Georges
77. Id.
78. 51 Fed. Reg. 29,642, 29,643 (1986) (the Secretary approved the plan as an
interim rule in 1986, indicating that the rule improved matters but was unsatisfactory for
long term conservation and management).
79. 52 Fed. Reg. 35,093 (1987).
80. See Conservation Law Foundation v. Franklin, 989 F.2d 54, 58 (lst Cir.
1993).
81. 58 Fed. Reg. 57,774, 57,775 (1993) (proposed Oct. 27, 1993).
82. Id.
83. 59 Fed. Reg. 26 (1994) (proposed Jan. 3, 1994).
84. BUCK supra note 3, at 6.
85. 60 Fed. Reg. 19,364 (1995).
86. As one commentator noted: "About twice the size of Massachusetts, [Georges
Bank is] more than twice as efficient at turning plankton and other tiny organisms into
harvestable fish than are the great fishing grounds of the Bering and North seas."
Schneider, supra note 72.
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Bank had sustained a valuable and culturally significant groundfish
fishery. The consequences of years of overfishing may have caused a
change in the species composition from groundfish to the much lower
valued skates and dogfish. Only time will tell whether this trend is
reversible.
2. Inefficiency
A major problem with the management of fisheries under the
Magnuson Act has been that it has allowed inefficiency. Two specific
area where inefficiency are demonstrated are the overcapitalization of the
U.S. fishing fleet and the problems with bycatch. Bycatch refers to fish
which are harvested by a fishing vessel, but which are not sold or kept
for personal use, including economic and regulatory discards.'
The National Marine Fisheries Service estimated in 1994 that
overfishing and overcapitalization, that is more fishing capacity than is
needed to catch the available fish, is depriving the U.S. commercial
fishing industry of approximately $3 billion a year in economic
benefits.8" The economic impact to recreational fishermen is not
quantified but is presumed to be equally large.
A dramatic example of overcapitalization is that of the southern
shrimp trawl fishery.89 The number of fishing vessels and the amount of
fishing effort in the Gulf of Mexico shrimp fishery tripled between 1960
and the late 1980s bringing the estimated 1994 fleet size to 15,000
vessels.' Yet during this period of growth, catches decreased by 300
pounds per vessel ton.91 The South Atlantic region has seen the same
phenomenon. In 1930 there were fewer than 650 boats catching 30
87. Economic discards are fish which are the target of a fishery but which are not
retained by the fishing vessel which harvested them because they are an unwanted size,
sex or quality. Regulatory discards refers are fish caught in a fishery which fishermen
are required by regulation to retain but not sell. See H.R. 39, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 4(b)(6).
88. Hearing on Transferable Quotas Under the Magnuson Act Before the Subcomm.
on Fisheries Management of the Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. 101 (1994) (The Crowded Sea, an Issue Paper on Limiting Entry to Marine
Fisheries by Ken Hinman and Carl Paulen submitted to the Subcommittee) [hereinafter
The Crowded Sea].
89. OUR LIvING OCEANS, supra note 4, at 71.
90. The Crowded Sea, supra note 88, at 102.
91. Id.
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million pounds of shrimp. By 1989 the number of fishermen with
fishing permits had increased to 5,300, yet catches remained at or below
that same 30 million pound level.'
There are significant negative externalities caused by the race to fish.
First, vessels are forced to operate on a 24-hour basis, often in hazardous
conditions, until quotas are reached. This risks the safety of both vessel
and crew. Additionally, fish too big or small to be conveniently
processed are discarded resulting in huge amounts of waste. Lastly,
vessels have no incentive to avoid areas of where bycatch levels are
high. 3
The North Pacific Region is a good example of the U.S. bycatch
problem. Every year more fish are discarded dead in the North Pacific
than are landed by U.S. fishermen in the North Atlantic. 4 Over 740
million pounds of dead or dying fish were dumped over the side in 1993
including 16 million pounds of halibut, 770,000 pounds of herring, 16
million crab an over 370,000 salmon.' This represents blatant waste of
a valuable U.S. resource.
3. Conflicts of Interest Among Voting Members of the Regional
Councils
A third problem with management under the Magnuson Act has been
the problem of actual or perceived conflicts of interest. Since the
original act was passed, the safeguards put in place to prevent conflicts
have eroded. This has caused the loss of public confidence in the
Councils' decisionmaking. This is significant because allocation of
fishing quotas or opportunities among user groups is undoubtedly one of
92. Id.
93. See generally, Hearings on the Reauthorization of the Magnuson Fishery Con-
servation and Magnuson Act Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries, Wildlife and Oceans of
the House Comm. on Resources, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statements by Jeff
Hendricks, General Manager, Alaska Ocean Seafood Limited Partnership; Paul Seaton,
President Alaska Marine Conservation Council; and Margaret Hall, on behalf of United
Catcher Boats) available in LEXIS, LEGIS Library, CNGTST File.
94. Discards in the Groundfish Fisheries of the Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands and the
Gulf of Alaska During 1993, paper prepared by the Pacific Associates for the Alaska
Department of Fish and Game (1994), reprinted in Hearings on the Reauthorization of
the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act Before the Subcomm. on
Fisheries, Wildlife and Oceans of the House Comm. on Resources, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995).
95. Id.
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the most controversial issues now facing the Councils. Allocation
measures are "supposed to be fair and equitable to all fishermen;
reasonably calculated to promote conservation; and carried out in such
a manner that no particular individual, corporation, or other entity
acquires an excessive share of [fishing] privileges."96 Public confidence
in, and thus adherence to, fisheries management measures depends on the
absence of even an appearance of conflict.
The erosion of the safeguards put in place to prevent conflicts began
shortly after the Act was passed. First, in 1982 Congress exempted the
entire Council system from the Federal Advisory Committee Act.97 The
action was justified on the grounds that the FACA's procedural
requirements were too burdensome and hampered the Councils'
interaction with their scientific and statistical committees. 98 Second,
Congress exempted Council members from the principal conflict of
interest provisions of the U.S. Code.99
Congress attempted to limit the effect of this exemption by requiring
the voting members and the executive director of each Council to
disclose any financial interest in the harvesting, processing, or marketing
of fishery resources under the jurisdiction of the Council held by that
person, or any relative or partner of that person. 1°° The limiting effect
was insignificant because the disclosure forms simply had to be filed for
public inspection at the Council offices and because Congress did not
require those voting members with a conflict of interest to abstain from
voting. Thus, as it stands now, no penalty is imposed on a voting
member for voting in a manner that results in a direct financial benefit
to that member.
This situation has made some Council members uncomfortable.
Walter Pereyra, a member of the North Pacific Fishery Management
Council and a Seattle fishing boat owner told the Seattle Times, "I
shouldn't even be on the council making these kinds of decisions [with
respect to pollock quotas] that I have a conflict on ... I think that's true
96. See generally, Conflicts of Interest Within the Regional Fisheries Management
Councils: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries Management of the Comm. on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries House of Representatives, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 1994
(statement by Frank Degeorge, Inspector General U.S. Dept. of Commerce) [hereinafter
Conflict Hearing].
97. Act of Jan. 12, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-453, 96 Stat. 2481, 2485 (1983).
98. Myhre, supra note 46, at 50.
99. 18 U.S.C. § 208 (1988).
100. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(k) (1988).
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of every member of the council. It should be in the hands of the
professional managers." ''
Not only Council members, but almost all participants in the fishery
management debates view reform of the Council system as necessary to
the attainment of the conservation objectives of the Act. Fishermen,
conservationists, the public at large, state government officials and the
Inspector General of the Department of Commerce have uniformly
voiced the need to restore confidence in the Council system by mitigating
conflicts of interest."
I. REAUTHORIZATION OF THE MAGNUSON ACT
The current authorization for appropriations under the Magnuson Act
lapsed on September 30, 1993. Because Congress failed to reauthorize
the law in both 1993 and 1994, the reauthorization is taking place in
1995. Two significant bills, the Sustainable Fisheries Act,'" and the
Fishery Conservation and Management Amendments of 1995,'" have
been proposed to address the problems of overfishing, inefficiency and
conflicts of interest. Generally, the bills represent the first major
amendments to Title mII of the Act, the U.S. fishery management system.
Each bill dramatically improves the existing regime for fisheries
conservation and management.
A. The Senate's Sustainable Fisheries Act of 1994-S. 39
The Sustainable Fisheries Act of 1994 would amend the Act to
extend the authorization of appropriations through 1999. Its major
provisions include:
101. Ross Anderson and Duff Wilson, A Fishy Situation-Critics Say Members of
Panel Set Up to Manage Rich Fisheries Zone Off Alaska are Watching Over Their Own
Self-Interests at the Same Time, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 10, 1991, at Al.
102. See generally, Conflict Hearing, supra note 96 (statements by Robert
Endreson, President, Hawaii Fishermen's Foundation; Bill Mott, Campaign Director,
The Marine Fish Conservation Network; Mindy Cameron, Seattle Times editorial writer;
Mike Lowry, Governor, State of Washington; and Frank DeGeorge, Inspector General,
U.S. Dep't of Commerce).
103. S. 39, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
104. H.R. 39, supra note 87.
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1. Fisheries Conservation
In an effort to prevent further decline in fish stocks, the bill defines
overfishing, a term left ambiguous in the original Act."° In addition,
each FMP is required to specify objective and measurable criteria for
classifying when the fishery to which the plan applies would be or is
overfished, with an analysis of how the criteria were determined and the
relationship of the criteria to the reproductive potential of stocks of fish
in that fishery."° It also calls for an annual report by the Secretary of
Commerce on the status of fisheries that are overfished or approaching
an overfished condition. 1"7 Each Council would be given one year to
propose a plan to halt overfishing and restore the fishery.' The FMP
must specify a time period for stopping overfishing and rebuilding the
fishery. A 10-year maximum time period is set out in the bill, modified
by a statement that it should be as "short as possible."'" As a final
measure, if a Council fails to come up with a plan to halt overfishing,
the Secretary may step in and implement an FMP to do so.) 0
The bill has three provisions to deal with the inevitable economic
consequences to fishermen of a stock rebuilding program. First, the
Secretary may work with the Councils, affected states, fishery dependent
communities, the fishing industry, conservation organizations, and other
interested parties, to develop a sustainable development strategy for any
fishery defined as overfished.'" This includes the identification of
federal and state programs which can be used to provide assistance to
fishery dependent communities during the recovery effort as well as the
development of a comprehensive long-term plan to guide the transition
to a sustainable fishery.' Second, at the Secretary's discretion, he may
105. S. 39, supra note 103, at 103(8). The terms "overfishing" and "overfished"
mean "a level or rate of fishing mortality that jeopardizes the capacity of a fishery to
produce the maximum sustainable yield on a continuing basis." Id.
106. Id. § 111(a)(10).
107. Id. § 113.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. § 111 (e)(1)(C). Additionally, if a Council finds that an emergency exists
involving any fishery, the Secretary must promulgate emergency regulations necessary
to address the problem. Id. § 113.
111. Id. § 119(a).
112. Id.
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declare a fishery resource disaster."' The Secretary is then authorized
to make money available to be used by the affected state.114 Lastly, the
bill sets out a vessel buy-out program for the purposes of reducing the
number of vessels and fishing effort in the overfished fishery and easing
the financial burdens on fishermen displaced by the recovery effort." 5
2. W ste Reduction
The bill specifically targets the problems of overcapitalization and
byeatch. Overcapitalization is addressed in two ways. First, through the
vessel buy-back program set out above, and second, through the
encouragement of the use of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) in
appropriate fisheries. Individual transferable quotas are defined as a
"revocable federal authorization to harvest or process a quantity of fish
under a unit or quota share that represents a percentage of the total
allowable catch of a stock of fish, that may be received or held by a
[person] ... for their exclusive use, and that may be transferred ... to
another person.... "116 ITQs are a means of restricting access in a
fishery. Under the current Magnuson Act, FMPs are allowed to create
ITQs but in practice, these measures are not often used."' The bill
encourages the use of ITQs by instructing the Secretary of Commerce to
promulgate mandatory guidelines for the establishment of any ITQ
113. Id. § 119.
114. Funds are to come from the Ocean Conservation Trust Fund, established by
the bill for this limited purpose only. Money is to be generated for the fund by assessing
annual fees on holders of fishing permits. Id. § 119(a).
115. Id. § 119(a). The buy-out program is highly controversial because itaddresses
the economic needs of fishing vessel owners and does not protect crew members or
fishery dependent businesses. The buy-out program would require that (1) a fishery
management plan is in place that limits access to the fishery and prevents replacement
of fishing effort that is bought out; (2) vessel or permits acquired under the buy-out
program cannot re-enter the fishery or contribute to excess fishing effort in other
fisheries; and (3) criteria are established to determine the types and numbers of vessels
which are eligible for participation.
116. Id. § 103(5).
117. ITQs were not often used as a management tool because fishermen felt that
controlling the number of people allowed to fish revoked their traditional rights to fish.
The collapse of many important fisheries has caused an increasing number of fishermen
to realize that limiting entry may be an effective management tool. 1TQs are in place
in the Atlantic Surf Clam and Ocean Quahog Fishery (50 C.F.R. § 652 (1993)) and the
South Atlantic wreckfish fishery (50 C.F.R. § 646.10 (1993)).
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system." 8 Guidelines are important because under the Act the Councils
and the Secretary must take into account "present participation in the
fishery" when establishing a system for limiting access to the fishery."9
Because specific guidelines have not been stated in the past, Councils
have been reluctant to use this management tool for fear of the legal and
policy issues that may be raised in allocating fishing privileges.120  The
guidelines mandated in the bill are meant to help Councils overcome this
fear by dealing with ITQ-related issues such as initial allocation,
eligibility for participation, consolidation, and access by entry-level
fishermen.
The bill also calls for waste reduction. It defines categories of
bycatch and requires any FMP developed by a Council or the Secretary
to (1) assess the level of bycatch occurring in each fishery including the
effect of a fishery on other stocks of fish in the ecosystem; and (2)
minimize, to the extent practicable, mortality caused by waste and
discards of unusable fish.' Additionally the bill encourages Councils
to adopt management measures that provide a harvest preference or other
incentives for fishing vessels within each gear group that employ fishing
practices resulting in lower levels of bycatch.'1
3. Council Reform
S. 39 contains significant measures to reform the Council process.
The bill requires Council members to recuse themselves from voting on
Council decisions that would have a "significant and predictable effect"
on their financial interests." A Council decision would be considered
to have a "significant and predictable effect" if there is a "close causal
link between the Council decision and an expected and disproportionate
benefit, shared only by a minority of persons within the same industry
sector or gear group, to the financial interest of the Council member. 24
118. S. 39, supra note 103, § I11(c).
119. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(b)(6)(A) (1988).
120. ITQs are a fishing privilege and not a property right. S. 39 states that an ITQ
is not a property right and authorizes the Secretary to terminate or limit any ITQ at any
time without paying compensation to the holder of the quota. S. 39, supra note 103,
§ 111(c).
121. Id. § 111(a)(5).
122. Id. § 111(b)(4).
123. Id. § 110(g)(8).
124. Id.
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This language prevents Council members from voting on decisions
benefitting only themselves or a minority in their gear group, but permits
them to express their views 6n matters on which they have expertise. It
thus prevents Council members from voting on certain matters without
requiring so much abstention from voting that the Councils are rendered
ineffective. The bill directs the Secretary to select a "designated official"
with federal conflict of interest experience to attend Council meeting and
make determinations regarding the financial interests of members."z
These determinations are to occur at the request of the affected Council
member or at the initiative of the designated official.
B. The House of Representatives' Fishery Conservation and Manage-
ment Amendments of 1995-H.R. 39
The Fishery Conservation and Management Amendments would also
extend the authorization for appropriations through 1999. Its major
provisions include:
1. Fisheries Conservation
The House bill also defines overfishing and requires the Regional
Councils to define overfishing in every FMP.12 Each FMP must include
a measurable and objective determination of what constitutes overfishing
in a fishery and must include a rebuilding program for any fishery which
the Council or the Secretary has determined is overfished.12  If the
Secretary determines that overfishing has occurred in any fishery, he
must notify the Council and request that action be taken to halt the
overfishing.1'8 If the Council fails to take action to stop the overfishing
within one year, the Secretary is directed to prepare an FMP to establish
the necessary rebuilding program."'
125. Id. § 11o(g)(2).
126. H.R. 39, supra note 87, § 9(a). Overfishing is defined in the House bill as
"a level or rate of fishing mortality that jeopardizes the ability of a stock of fish to
produce maximum sustainable yield on a continuing basis." Id. § 4(b)(6).
127. Id. § 10(e).
128. Id.
129. Id.
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2. Waste Reduction
The House bill has three provisions relating to waste reduction.
First, it requires FMPs to include conservation and management
measures necessary to minimize bycatch to the maximum extent
practicable, including incentive and harvest preferences within a fishing
gear group to promote the avoidance of bycatch.130
Second, it includes a fishing capacity reduction program."' The bill
authorizes the Secretary to permanently reduce fishing capacity at the
least cost, and in the shortest period of time, through the removal of
vessels and permits from a fishery.3 2  The Secretary is to make
payments to scrap, or otherwise render permanently unusable for fishing
in the United States, vessels that operate in a given fishery and to acquire
federal fishing permits that authorize participation in a fishery. 3
Funding for the government expenditures are to come from payments
from the participants of each fishery."4
Third, the bill authorizes the creation of an individual quota limited
access programs. The term individual quota is defined as a grant of
permission to harvest or process a quantity of fish in a fishery, during
each fishing season for which the permission is granted, equal to a stated
percentage of the total allowable catch for the fishery. 135 Similar to the
Senate bill, the House bill includes language stating that an individual
quota is not to be construed as a property right but is rather a grant of
permission to the holder to engage in fishing activities.'36 Thus, the
grant may be revoked without conferring any right of compensation to
the holder of the individual quota. In contrast to the Senate bill, the
House version provides that an individual quota is to expire not later than
seven years after the date it is issued, in accordance with the terms of a
fishery management plan.'37
The individual quota system is designed to generate funds to help
pay for the vessel buy-out and permit buy-back programs outlined above.
Fees equal to one percent of the value of fish authorized to be harvested
130. Id. § 7.




135. Id. § 16(b).
136. Id.
137. Id.
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in one year under the individual quota are to be collected from the initial
holder of the individual quota." 8 Thereafter, an annual fee of four
percent of the value of the fish authorized to be harvested each year
under an individual quota share are to be collected from the holder of the
individual quota share.'39 An additional fee of one percent of the value
of fish authorized to be harvested each year would be charged to any
holder who wished to permanently transfer his share to another person.
Again, similar to the Senate bill, the House bill directs the Secretary
to issue regulations which establish requirements for creating an
individual quota system.' The regulations are to be developed in
accordance with recommendations submitted by a special review panel
established in the bill. 42 The regulations must specify factors that must
be considered by each Regional Fishery Management Council in
determining whether a fishery should be managed under an individual
quota system. 43
3. Council Reform
The House bill differs from the Senate version in its attempt to
reform the Council process. In the House version, the Secretary, in
consultation with the Councils, and not later than one year after the date
of enactment of the Fishery Conservation and Management Amendments
of 1995, is directed to establish rules which prohibit an "affected
individual" from voting on a matter in which the individual has an
interest that would be significantly affected."~ The term "interest that
would be significantly affected" is defined as "a personal financial
interest which would be augmented by voting on the matter and which
would only be shared by a minority of other persons within the same
industry sector or gear group whose activity would be directly affected
by a Council's action."" Voting members are asked to recuse them-
selves if they determine voting would violate the Secretary's rules, or if
the General Counsel of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
138. Id. § 16(c).
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140. Id.
141. Id. § 16(d).
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143. Id.
144. Id. § 8(i).
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Administration (by the request of any council member) determines that
voting by that member would violate the rules."4
IV. CONCLUSION
It has been nearly 20 years since the Magnuson Act brought the
fishery resources within 200 miles of all U.S. coasts under federal
jurisdiction and established a new system of managing those resources
through the Regional Fishery Management Councils. The United States
has witnessed both notable successes and failures during those twenty
years. Its major success has been eliminating foreign overfishing. Its
major failure has been substituting U.S. overfishing in its place. Today
the most pressing problems facing the management of U.S. fisheries are
overfishing, inefficiencies and lack of public confidence in the decision-
making of the Regional Councils due to conflicts of interest.
The current reauthorization process should be used to correct these
problems. The Senate's Sustainable Fisheries Act and the House's
Fishery Conservation and Management Amendments of 1995 would both
strengthen the conservation and management provisions of the Act.
Congress is fortunate that the bills are already very similar. They both
address the problem of overfishing by defining it and requiring recovery
programs be put in place once a fishery is determined to be overfished.
Both bills adopt incentives to curb bycatch problems. Further, both bills
adopt a vessel capacity reduction program and a limited access program.
Finally, both bills reform the council decisionmaking process by
requiring voting recusals from "interested" council members. Congress
must now sit down and work toward integrating the bills to finalize the
reauthorization process and to create a stronger Magnuson Act.
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